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Testing the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance 
Jean Baptiste Van der Henst & Dan Sperber 
 
1. Introduction 
A general theory is testable not directly but through consequences it implies when 
it is taken together with auxiliary hypotheses. The test can be weaker or stronger 
depending, in particular, on the extent to which the consequences tested are specifically 
entailed by the theory (as opposed to being mostly entailed by the auxiliary hypotheses 
and being equally compatible with other general theories). The earliest experimental 
work based on relevance theory (Jorgensen, Miller and Sperber 1984, Happé 1993) 
tested and confirmed Sperber & Wilson (1981) echoic account of irony (and much 
experimental work done since on irony has broadly confirmed it and refined it further). 
While this account of irony is part and parcel of relevance theory, it is nevertheless 
compatible with different pragmatic approaches. The experimental confirmation of this 
account, therefore, provides only weak support for relevance theory as a whole. More 
recent experimental work has made explicit, tested and confirmed other and more 
specific and central consequences of relevance theory (e.g. Sperber, Cara & Girotto, 
1995; Politzer, 1996; Gibbs & Moise, 1997; Hardman 1998; Nicolle & Clark 1999; 
Matsui, 2000, 2001; Girotto, Kemmelmeir, Sperber & Van der Henst, 2001; Noveck, 
2001; Noveck, Bianco & Castry, 2001; Van der Henst, Politzer and Sperber, 2002, Van 
der Henst, Carles & Sperber, 2002, Noveck & Posada, 2003; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003). 
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Here we review experiments that test consequences of the most central tenets of the 
theory, namely the cognitive and the communicative principle of relevance. 
 
2. The basic tenets of relevance theory 
Relevance, as characterised in relevance theory, is a property of inputs to cognitive 
processes. These inputs include external stimuli (for instance utterances) and internal 
representations (for instance memories or conclusions from inferences that may then be 
used as premises for further inferences). When is an input relevant? An input is relevant 
to an individual when processing it in a context of previously available assumptions 
yields positive cognitive effects, that is, improvements to the individual’s knowledge 
that could not be achieved from processing either the context on its own, or the new 
input on its own. These improvements may consist in the derivation of contextual 
implications, in the confirmation of uncertain assumptions, in the correction of errors, 
and also, arguably, in the reorganisation of knowledge so as to make it more appropriate 
for future use. 
Inputs are not just relevant or irrelevant; when relevant, they are more or less so. A 
relatively high degree of relevance is what makes some inputs worth processing. Many 
of the potential inputs competing for an individual’s processing resources at a given time 
may offer a modicum of relevance, but few are likely to be relevant enough to deserve 
attention. What makes these worth processing is, to begin with, that they yield 
comparatively higher cognitive effects. However, two inputs yielding the same amount 
of cognitive effect may differ in the amount of processing effort1 required to produce 
                                                 
1 “Effort” as used here refers here to any expenditure of energy in the pursuit of a goal. It 
is not restricted to conscious effort. 
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this effect. Obviously, the lesser the effort, the better. If relevance is what makes an 
input worth processing, then the relevance of an input is not just a matter of the 
cognitive effect it yields but also of the mental effort it requires. Hence the 
characterisation of relevance in terms of effect and effort: 
 
 (1)  Relevance of an input to an individual 
a.  Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects 
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to 
the individual at that time. 
b.  Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the 
lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
 
Here is a simplified illustration of how the relevance of alternative inputs might be 
compared in terms of effort and effect. Suppose you want to take the next train to 
Bordeaux and compare statements (2)-(4) (assumed to be uttered by a reliable informer): 
 
(2) The next train to Bordeaux is at 3:24 pm 
(3) The next train to Bordeaux is after 3pm 
(4) The next train to Bordeaux is 36 minutes before 4pm 
 
All three statements would be relevant to you, but (2) would be more relevant than either 
(3) or (4). Statement (2) would be more relevant than (3) for reasons of cognitive effect: 
(2) entails (3), and therefore yields all the conclusions derivable from (2), and more 
besides, and these extra conclusions themselves have practical consequences for the 
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planning of your trip. Statement (2) would be more relevant than (4) for reasons of 
processing effort: although (2) and (4) are logically equivalent, and therefore yield 
exactly the same cognitive effects, these effects are easier to derive from (2) than from 
(4), which requires an additional effort of calculus with no additional benefit whatsoever 
(in the ordinary situation envisaged). More generally, when similar amounts of effort are 
required by two alternative inputs, the effect factor is decisive in determining degrees of 
relevance, and when similar amounts of effect are achievable, the effort factor is 
decisive. In experimental work, as we will illustrate, this makes it relatively easy to 
manipulate the relevance of stimuli across conditions by keeping the effort factor 
constant and modifying the effect factor or, conversely, by keeping the effect factor 
constant and modifying the effort factor. 
Relevance theory claims that, because of the way their cognitive system has 
evolved, humans have an automatic tendency to maximise relevance. As a result of 
constant selection pressure towards efficiency, perceptual mechanisms tend 
automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, memory mechanisms tend 
automatically to store and, when appropriate, retrieve potentially relevant pieces of 
knowledge, and inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process these inputs in the 
most productive way. This universal tendency is described in the First, or Cognitive, 
Principle of Relevance: 
  
(5) Cognitive Principle of Relevance 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. 
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This spontaneous tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible to predict to some 
extent to which available stimuli people will pay attention and how they will process 
them. 
There is a wealth of evidence in the experimental study of attention and memory 
that could be re-analysed in order to see to what extent it supports the cognitive principle 
of relevance. This is not our field of expertise, but the challenge there, we surmise, 
would be not so much to find support as to find support that is specific enough to 
relevance theory, in other words to find predictions that follow from the cognitive 
principle of relevance but not—or not as directly—from standard psychological 
approaches to attention and memory. In other areas, the study of inference and that of 
communication in particular, the cognitive principle does have consequences that are far 
from trivial. Some of these consequences in the domain of category-based induction 
have been explored by Medin et al (in press). In section 2 of this chapter we will present 
experimental tests of consequences based on work by Van der Henst and his 
collaborators on relational reasoning. 
Relevance theory has been mostly an exploration of the implications of the second, 
Communicative Principle of Relevance for human verbal communication. The human 
tendency to maximise relevance makes it possible not only to predict some of other 
people’s cognitive processes, but also to try to influence them—how indeed could you 
aim at influencing people if you had no way to predict how your behaviour would affect 
their thought? Human intentional communication, and in particular verbal 
communication, involves the attribution, by the communicator and the addressee, of 
mental states to one another. This attribution is greatly helped by the relative 
predictability of relevance-guided cognitive processes. In particular a speaker must 
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intend and expect that the hearer will pay attention to the utterance produced. If attention 
tends automatically to go to inputs that seem relevant enough to be worth processing, 
then it follows that, to succeed, the speaker must intend and expect her utterance to be 
seen as relevant enough by the hearer she is addressing. By the very act of speaking to 
him, the communicator therefore encourages the hearer to presume that the utterance is 
so relevant. This is the basis for the Communicative Principle of Relevance: 
  
(6) Communicative Principle of Relevance 
Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.  
 
An utterance, so the theory claims, conveys not just a vague expectation, but a precise 
presumption of relevance, which the notion of “optimal relevance” captures: 
 
(7) Optimal relevance 
An utterance is optimally relevant to the hearer just in case: 
(a)  It is relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s processing effort; 
(b)  It is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences. 
 
According to clause (7a) of this definition, the hearer is entitled to expect the utterance 
to be at least relevant enough to be worth processing, which means (given the cognitive 
principle of relevance) that the utterance should be more relevant than any alternative 
input available at the time. 
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Is the hearer entitled to higher expectation than this (already high) minimum level 
spelled out in clause (7a)? The speaker wants to be understood. It is therefore in her 
interest to make her utterance as easy as possible to understand, and to provide evidence 
not just for the cognitive effects she aims to achieve in the hearer but also for further 
cognitive effects which, by holding his attention, will help her achieve her goal. 
Speakers, however, are not omniscient, and they cannot be expected to go against their 
own interests and preferences in producing an utterance. There may be relevant 
information that they are unable or unwilling to provide, and wordings that would 
convey their meaning more economically, but that they are unable to think of at the time, 
or are unwilling to use (for reason of propriety for instance). All this is spelled out in 
clause (7b) of the definition of optimal relevance, which states that the ostensive 
stimulus is the most relevant one (i.e. yielding the greatest effects, in return for the 
smallest processing effort) that the communicator is able and willing to produce. 
The Communicative Principle of Relevance justifies a specific inferential procedure 
for interpreting an utterance, that is for discovering what the speaker meant by uttering 
it: 
 
(8) Relevance-guided comprehension procedure 
a.  Follow a path of least effort in constructing and testing interpretive 
hypotheses (regarding disambiguation, reference resolutions, 
implicatures, etc.). 
b.  Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
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Given clause (7b) of the definition of optimal relevance, it is reasonable for the hearer to 
follow a path of least effort because the speaker is expected (within the limits of her 
abilities and preferences) to make her utterance as easy as possible to understand. Since 
relevance varies inversely with effort, the very fact that an interpretation is easily 
accessible gives it an initial degree of plausibility. It is also reasonable for the hearer to 
stop at the first interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, because there 
should never be more than one. A speaker who wants her utterance to be as easy as 
possible to understand should formulate it (within the limits of her abilities and 
preferences) so that the first interpretation to satisfy the hearer’s expectation of 
relevance is the one she intended to convey. An utterance with two apparently 
satisfactory competing interpretations would cause the hearer the unnecessary extra 
effort of choosing between them, and, because of this extra effort, the resulting 
interpretation (if there were one) could never satisfy clause (7b) of the definition of 
optimal relevance. Thus, when a hearer following the path of least effort arrives at an 
interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, he should, in the absence of 
contrary evidence, adopt it. Since comprehension is a non-demonstrative inference 
process, this interpretation of the speaker’s meaning may be erroneous. Still, it is the 
most plausible interpretation in the circumstances. 
The hypothesis that hearers spontaneously follow the relevance-guided 
comprehension procedure spelled out in (8) can be experimentally tested by 
manipulating either the effort factor and, in particular, by changing the order of 
accessibility of various interpretations. It can also be tested by manipulating the effect 
factor and thereby making specific interpretation more or less likely to satisfy the 
hearer’s expectations of relevance. This, as we will illustrate in section 3, is what 
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Girotto, Sperber and their collaborators have done in a series of experiments with the 
Wason Selection Task. 
Most work in relevance theory so far has been focused on utterance interpretation 
rather than on utterance production. The theory, however, has testable implications 
regarding the production process. Speakers often fail to be relevant to their audience, 
and sometimes do not even make the effort to be relevant. Still, utterances couldn’t 
effectively convey the presumption of their own relevance unless speakers were, most of 
the time, aiming at optimal relevance and achieving it often enough. In section 4, we 
describe a series of experiments that were aimed at testing to what extent speakers were 
actually aiming at optimal relevance. 
 
3. Testing the Cognitive Principle of Relevance with relational reasoning tasks 
In most studies on reasoning, psychologists analyse participants’ successful or 
unsuccessful performance in reasoning tasks. They look at the percentages of correct 
conclusions or at the time taken to draw such a conclusion. They investigate factors that 
impede or enhance correct performance, such as the premises’ content, the premises’ 
complexity, task instructions, or IQ. They use this evidence to test various theories of the 
inferential machinery that underlies our reasoning ability. Some argue that people reason 
by constructing mental models of the premises (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Others 
support the idea that people reason by applying general inference rules (Rips, 1994; 
Braine & O’Brien, 1998). Yet others have proposed that reasoning relies on domain-
specific procedures (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989).  
Relevance theory claims that comprehension is based on a domain-specific 
inferential procedure, but it is not, in and by itself, a theory of human reasoning. It is, in 
 238
fact, compatible with the view that an important role is played in reasoning by mental 
models, or by inference rules, or by both, or by yet other kinds of procedures in a 
domain-general or in a domain-specific way.2 Nevertheless, relevance theory may make 
a direct contribution to the study of reasoning by suggesting testable claims not on the 
procedures (except in the case of comprehension) but on the goals of reasoning 
processes. 
Standard approaches to the study of reasoning have had little to say on what 
causes people to engage in reasoning—when they are not, that is, requested to do so by 
an experimenter—, what expectations they have in doing so, and what kind of 
conclusions satisfy these expectations bringing the process to a close.3 What guides 
reasoners to infer a specific conclusion? At first sight, one might argue that people aim 
at inferring a conclusion that logically follows from the premises. However, from any 
given set of premises, an infinity of conclusions logically follows. Most of these valid 
conclusions are of no interest at all. For instance, nobody would burden one’s mind by 
inferring from the single premise P the logical conclusion Not (not (not (not P))). 
Harman has formulated this idea as a principle of clutter avoidance: “It is not reasonable 
or rational to fill your mind with trivial consequences of your beliefs, when you have 
better things to do with your time, as you often do” (Harman, 1995, p. 186). 
It is not sufficient for a conclusion to be logically valid in order to be worth 
inferring. Some valid conclusions are too trivial ever to be derived, and others may be 
derived in some circumstances and not in others. From the same set of premises, we 
                                                 
2 Sperber however has been defending the view that the human mind is “massively 
modular” (Sperber1994), and Sperber and Wilson (2002) have argued that linguistic 
comprehension is modular. 
3 See Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991:20-22) for a notable exception. 
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might derive one particular conclusion in one situation, another conclusion in a second 
situation, or no conclusions at all in a third. In a recent study, we proposed that the 
conclusions that people are inclined to draw are those, if any, that seem relevant enough 
in the context (Van der Henst, Sperber & Politzer, 2002). This, of course, is a direct 
consequence of the cognitive principle of relevance. 
In this study, we compared so-called “determinate” and “indeterminate” relational 
problems such as those: 
 
A determinate problem: 
A is taller than B 
B is taller than C 
An indeterminate Problem: 
A is taller than B 
A is taller than C 
 
Such relational problems have been empirically investigated in many studies (see Evans, 
Newstead & Byrne, 1993 for a review). Determinate problems are so-called because the 
one relation between the three terms A, B, and C which is not explicitly described in the 
premises, that between A and C, is nevertheless inferable from them: in our example, A 
is taller than C. Indeterminate problem are so-called because the one relation which is 
not described in the premises is not inferable from them: in our example, B might be 
taller than C or C might be taller than B. Hence, nothing follows from the premises 
about the relation between B and C. The goal of most studies on relational problems has 
been to describe the way in which the premises are being mentally represented and 
processed by reasoners. Typically, participants have had to answer a specific question 
like “What is the relation between A and C?” and the evidence consists in the rate of 
correct answers. The correct answer for the determinate problem above would be: A is 
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taller than C. The correct answer for indeterminate problem would be: it is impossible to 
tell. Indeterminate problems tend to yield a lower rate of correct answers than 
determinate problems.4 
In our study, our aim was not to assess and explain the relative difficulty of 
determinate and indeterminate problems. Instead of asking a question about a specific 
relation between two terms mentioned in the premises, we just asked what, if anything, 
follows from the premises? We were interested in what causes some participants, 
particularly with indeterminate problems, to answer nothing follows.  
Not only is it always possible to infer conclusions from a given set of premises, 
but what is more, some of these conclusions are quite obvious: for instance, from two 
premises P and Q, their conjunction P-and-Q trivially follows. So when people answer 
that nothing follows from a given set of premises, either they just fail to see the obvious, 
or, we suggest, they mean that nothing relevant follows. If so, nothing follows answer 
are evidence of people’s intuitions of relevance. In particular, if a problem creates the 
expectation that the most relevant conclusion to be derived should be of a certain type 
and, at the same time, does not warrant any conclusion of this particular type, people 
may be tempted to answer that nothing follows. This, we tried to show, is what happens 
with indeterminate relational problems. 
What conclusion could participants expect to infer from two relational premises 
in the context of a reasoning task? In determinate and indeterminate relational problems 
such as the examples above, there are three terms, A, B, and C, one type of asymmetric 
                                                 
4 Supporters of mental model theory explain this fact by pointing out that the mental 
representation of indeterminate problems calls for two mental models (to represent the 
two possible relations between B and C) as opposed to one model for the determinate 
problems (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989). 
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and transitive relation, e.g. taller than, and therefore three possible relations of this type, 
in the pairs A-B, B-C, A-C. Two of these relations are described in the premises. Given 
the communicative principle of relevance, these relations are presumed to be relevant in 
the context of the task, and, more specifically, the two relations given in the premises are 
expected be relevant in allowing the inference of the third relation. Of course, it could be 
rightly pointed out that, in these experimental situations, the premises on which 
participants are asked to reason are arbitrary and without relationship with their real-life 
concerns. Therefore neither the premises nor the conclusions that can be derived from 
them have any genuine relevance. Still, we would argue, just as participants reason 
under the pretence that the premises are true (that, say, the premise “Jim is taller than 
Paul” is about two actual people), they reason under the pretence that the premises, and 
the conclusions they are expected to derive from them, might be relevant in some 
ordinary context of knowledge about the individuals or the entities described in the 
premises. It is not hard, for instance, to pretend that it might be relevant to know that Jim 
is taller than Paul and that Paul is taller than Dick, and to assume then that it would be 
relevant to draw the inference that Jim is taller than Dick. 
Participants’ expectations of relevance are easily satisfied in the case of 
determinate problems but not in the case of indeterminate ones, where the relation that is 
not specified in the premises cannot be inferred from them. Hence, with indeterminate 
problems, participants may be tempted to answer that nothing follows. This is indeed 
what we observed. In our studies, 45% of the participants gave a “nothing follows” 
response to indeterminate problems, while only 8 % did so with determinate problems. 
This difference in the rate of “nothing follows” answer between determinate and 
indeterminate problems is, of course, not surprising. However, it had never been 
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demonstrated before, and, more importantly, only relevance theory provides a simple 
and direct explanation of this difference. When participants say that nothing follows, 
what they mean, we surmise, is not that it is impossible to infer anything at all from the 
two premises, but that it is impossible to derive a conclusion relevant enough to be 
worth deriving, namely, a conclusion about the third undescribed relation among the 
three items mentioned in the premises. 
Nevertheless, facing a situation where what would be the most relevant 
conclusion cannot be inferred, about one half of the participants do offer some positive 
conclusion. Are they giving up on relevance and aiming just for any logically valid 
conclusion, or are they still guided by considerations of relevance? As we will show, one 
can find out by examining the specific conclusions they actually derive.  
Consider the determinate conclusion A is taller than B and C, or equivalently, A 
is the tallest, derived from our Indeterminate Problem. This conclusion is merely a 
linguistic integration of the premises. It may seem trivial, especially in the context of a 
reasoning experiment where, generally, participants are eager to demonstrate their 
reasoning skills to the experimenter. However, a conclusion such as A is the tallest may 
have some relevance of its own. There are ordinary situations where it would be relevant 
to know which item in a set is above the others with respect to some given property (e.g. 
who is the tallest?). Actually, in many situations, knowing which item in a set is above 
all the others with respect to some comparative property is more relevant than knowing 
the relative position of two other items in the set that are lower on the comparison scale. 
For instance, suppose you have the choice among three different cars all of which would 
satisfy your needs and you just want to buy the cheapest. You will probably be more 
interested in knowing which is the cheapest of the three than in knowing which is the 
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cheaper of the other two. Hence, inferring A is more… than B and C has some relevance 
since, assuming a quite ordinary context, it can be a step towards inferring further 
contextual implications (e.g. about which car to buy). 
One might query: How can deductively deriving a conclusion and adding it to, or 
substituting it for, an initial set of premises yield a more relevant point of departure for 
further reasoning, given that nothing can be derived from this conclusion that wasn't 
already derivable from the initial premises? In other words, how can such a conclusion 
be relevant at all, in a context where the premises from which it is derived are given? 
The fact that relevance is defined not just in terms of effect but also in terms of 
processing effort provides a simple answer. A set of premises with some deductively 
derived conclusion added could not carry more cognitive effects than the initial set and 
thus be more relevant on the effect side, but it can be more relevant on the effort side by 
allowing the same effects to be derived with less effort. The deduction of some specific 
conclusion from a set of premises may be a preliminary and effort-costly necessary step 
towards deriving cognitive effects from this set of premises. In that case, the conclusion 
is as relevant as the premises on the effect side and more relevant than the premises on 
the effort side. 
We frequently encounter information which we think is likely to prove useful in 
the future. We then retain this information, and often process it in such a way as to 
optimize its potential usefulness. Suppose, for instance, that you arrive in a holiday 
resort where you plan to spend a month with your family. You learn that there are three 
doctors in the resort, Smith, Jones, and Williams. You also learn the following two 
pieces of information: {Smith is a better doctor than Jones, Jones is a better doctor than 
Williams}. At the time, you don't need a doctor, but you might in the future, and would 
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then want to visit the best doctor in town. So the information is potentially relevant to 
you. You might just store the two pieces of information above, but from a cognitive 
point of view it would be more efficient to draw the conclusion: Smith is the best doctor 
straight away. By drawing this conclusion now, you prepare for future circumstances in 
which you would need a doctor. By adding this conclusion to the two initial premises, 
you are left with a set of premises for future inference with a greater expected relevance, 
since its exploitation will require fewer inferential steps. Moreover, if you expect not to 
need information about the other two doctors, it may be sufficient to remember just the 
conclusion Smith is the best doctor, replacing the initial two-premise set with the single 
derived conclusion, thus reducing the memory load. 
If what makes a conclusion seem relevant is that it spares effort for the possible 
derivation of cognitive effects, then it follows that the more effort it spares for such 
possible derivations, the greater will be its perceived relevance. In our initial study (Van 
der Henst, Sperber & Politzer, 2002), we manipulated the relevance of a relational 
conclusion of the form A is more…than B & C by formulating the premises so as to 
make the derivation of such a conclusion more or less effortful. In one type of problem, 
the derivation of this conclusion was very easy and thus the effort saved for the possible 
derivation of cognitive effects was quite low, whereas with another type of problem, 
deriving the conclusion was harder, and thus the effort saved was greater. The problems 
we used were the following5: 
 
                                                 
5 All the experiments reported in this section were carried out in French. 
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Problem 1: 
A is taller than B 
A is taller than C 
Problem 2: 
B is taller than A 
C is taller than A 
 
In both problems, the relation between B and C is indeterminate. Still, from either 
problem one can derive a variety of conclusions. For instance, from Problem 1, one can 
infer conclusion (9a) and (9b), and from Problem 2, one can infer conclusion (10a) and 
(10b): 
 
(9) (a) ‘A is taller than B and C’ 
 (b) ‘B and C are shorter than A’ 
(10) (a) ‘A is shorter than B and C’ 
 (b) ‘B and C are taller than A’ 
 
With the usual element of pretence involved in the experimental study of reasoning, 
such conclusions can be seen as having some relevance in that they may facilitate the 
derivation of further cognitive effects, given some plausible context. 
Deriving the single-subject conclusion (9a) from the premises of Problem 1 hardly 
involves any inferential effort. Since the grammatical subject (A) and the comparative 
term (taller than) are the same in the conclusion and in the premises, it amounts just to 
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merging the two premises in a single sentence. Deriving the single-subject conclusion 
(10a) from the premises of Problem 2, on the other hand, involves some genuine 
inferential effort: the grammatical object in the premises (A) has to be put in subject 
position, and the comparative term (taller than) has to be converted into its opposite 
(shorter than). It is rather the double-subject conclusion (10b) that amounts to a mere 
merging of the premises. If participants just went for the less effort-demanding 
conclusion, they should choose (9a) and (10b). However, if they are guided by 
considerations of relevance, they should choose (9a) and (10a).  
Conclusions (9a) and (9b) are logically equivalent and therefore, in any context, 
would yield the same effects, and so are and would conclusions (10a) and (10b). 
However, in most contexts, deriving these effects by using the single-subject 
conclusions (9a) and (10a) as premises is likely to cause less effort than doing by using 
the double-subject conclusions (9b) or (10b) as premises. Why? Because most piece of 
knowledge transmitted, constructed, and stored in human cognition has as its topic a 
single entity or a single category rather than a pair of entities or categories (for fairly 
obvious reasons having to do with cognitive efficiency). One is more likely, for instance, 
to encounter a contextual conditional premise of the form (11a) than of the form (11b): 
 
(11) (a) ‘If A is taller than B and C, then…’ 
 (b) ‘If B and C are shorter than A, then...’ 
 
From either of (9a) and (9b) and either of (11a) and (11b) as premises, the same 
conclusions can be derived, but the derivation will be more direct if the minor premise, 
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i.e. (9a) or (9b), of this conditional syllogism matches the antecedent of the major 
premise, i.e. (11a) or (11b). In other words, in most realistic contexts, single-subject 
conclusions such as (9a) and (10a) are likely to prove more relevant that double-subject 
conclusions such as (9b) and (10b). We predicted therefore that, in both Problem 1 and 
Problem 2, participants, guided by considerations of relevance, would derive more 
single-subject that double-subjects conclusions. 
There is a further reason, specific to the premises of Problem 2, why (10a) should 
be perceived as more potentially relevant than (10b). It is that the extra effort involved in 
deriving (10a) as compared to (10b) is effort expanded in the right direction. It can be 
seen as preparatory for the derivation of cognitive effect. This argument does not apply 
to (9a) and (9b) in Problem 1. As we mentioned, the derivation of (9a), unlike that of 
(9b), involves almost no effort. In other terms, the derivation of both (9a) and (10a) are 
steps in the right direction, but the derivation of (10a) is a much bigger step, and 
therefore a more useful one. This suggests that Problem 2 should be seen as yielding a 
relevant enough conclusion more frequently than Problem 1.  
For the reasons just developed, we expected that participants who produced a 
conclusion with Problem 1 and 2 would predominantly produce a single-subject 
conclusion and that there would be more such conclusions, and fewer “nothing follows,” 
with Problem 2 than with Problem 1. Note that there is nothing intuitively obvious about 
these predictions, which follow quite directly from the cognitive principle of relevance 
applied to this particular reasoning problem, and from no other approach we are aware 
of. Our findings, presented in Table 1, confirmed these predictions. 
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Table 1: Percentage of conclusion types for Problems 1 and 2. 
 Problem 1 
A is taller than B
A is taller than C
Problem 2 
B is taller than A 
C is taller than A 
Total 
Single-subject conclusions 26% 45% 35% 
Double-subject conclusions 14% 15% 14% 
Nothing follows 54% 31% 43% 
Other 6% 9% 8% 
 
Another way to increase the relevance of a conclusion A is more… than B and C 
inferred from indeterminate relational premises is to act on the effect side. As we 
pointed out, a conclusion cannot yield more cognitive effect than the premises from 
which it is deductively derived. However, the information contained in the premises of a 
problem can yield greater or lesser cognitive effects, depending on the wider context. 
The greater are these effects, the more useful it is to derive a conclusion which is a step 
towards the production of these effects, and therefore the more relevant is this 
conclusion. Acting on the effect side here means providing or suggesting a context in 
which a conclusion derived from the premises of a problem might yield greater or lesser 
cognitive effects. 
In Problem 2, the conclusion A is taller than B and C has a modicum of potential 
relevance. The cognitive effects that this conclusion might yield remain in the vague 
since no context is given. The relevance of such a conclusion can be increased by 
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manipulating the effect factor in the way we have just suggested. This can be done in 
particular by providing a context in which this conclusion will have clear contextual 
implications. Imagine for instance that the premises of Problem 2 are processed with the 
knowledge that the tallest person of A, B and C, is the tallest person in world. In this 
context, deducing that A is taller than B and C is a necessary step towards inferring that 
A is the tallest person in the world.  
We predict that people should be more inclined to produce the conclusion A is 
more… than B and C when an appropriate context is given than when no context is 
given, or than when a less or non appropriate context is given. We tested this prediction 
in three experiments of an unpublished study done with Guy Politzer. 
In the first experiment, participants received either a problem without explicit 
context (Problem 3) or a problem with an explicit context (Problem 4) and had to 
produce a conclusion: 
 
Problem 3: 
Premises: A is ahead of B 
A is ahead of C 
Problem 4: 
Context:   A, B and C were the top three finishers in the race last Sunday. 
Premises: A is ahead of B 
A is ahead of C 
 
For both problems, it follows from the premises that A is ahead of B and C. However, in 
the race context, inferring the logical conclusion A is ahead of B and C is a step towards 
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inferring the contextual implication A won the race. The possibility of deriving this 
contextual implication endows the logical conclusion A is ahead of B and C with greater 
relevance than in the absence of any explicit context. Since the inference that A is ahead 
of B and C has a greater relevance in the race context, it should be more frequently 
performed, and participants should formulate more determinate conclusions and fewer 
“nothing follows” answers. Our results indeed show that Problem 4 resulted in a higher 
rate of determinate conclusions than Problem 3 (54% vs. 70%, χ2 (1) = 5.59, p < .02). 
Moreover, in the race context, there were threee times as many determinate conclusions 
referring to the race context like “A is the first” or “A is the winner” than conclusions 
simply integrating the two premises like “A is ahead of B and C” or “B and C are 
behind A.”  
In a second experiment, we manipulated the effect factor by using two different 
explicit contexts both of which increased the relevance of the conclusion A is more… 
than B and C. However the context of Problem 5 (almost identical to that of Problem 4 
above) produced a greater increase in relevance than that Problem 6: 
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Problem 5: 
Context:   A, B and C were the first three finishers in the race last Sunday.. 
Premises: A arrived before B 
A arrived before C 
Problem 6: 
Context:   A, B and C were the last three three finishers in the race last Sunday. 
Premises: A arrived before B 
A arrived before C 
 
In Problem 5, the context explicitly focuses on people who were the first three in a race; 
if this is relevant at all, knowing who was the first should be even more relevant. The 
premises of the problem can thus achieve relevance by making it possible to infer who 
precisely arrived first and who did not. Deriving that A arrived before B and C enables 
one to infer three contextual implications: A won the race, B did not win the race, and C 
did not win the race. In Problem 6, the context focuses on people who arrived last in an 
athletics race. In contrast with Problem 5, deriving that A arrived before B and C makes 
it possible to infer only one contextual implication: A did not arrive last. Because the 
relation between B and C is indeterminate, it is impossible to infer who arrived last. The 
conclusion that A arrived before B and C has some relevance in Problem 6, but less so 
than in Problem 5 and should therefore be produced less often. Our results (see Table 2) 
show indeed that people derived more determinate conclusions in Problem 5 than in 
Problem 6 (94.4% vs. 74.7%, χ2 (1) = 13.45, p < .001).  
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Table 2: Percentage of conclusion types for Problems 6 and 7 
 Problem 5 
N = 90 
Problem 6 
N = 91 
Determinate conclusions 94.4 74.7 
Nothing follows 3.3 18.7 
Errors and weird answers  2.2 6.6 
 
Any explicit context evokes a wider implicit context of general knowledge. For 
instance, the explicit context of problem 5, “A, B and C were the first three finishers in 
the race last Sunday,” evokes background knowledge about racing, about the value 
attributed to winning, prizes or medals given to winners, and so on. So, inferring from 
the explicit context that A has won the race makes it possible to infer from the implicit 
context that A is likely to be pleased, that he may be given a medal or a prize, and so on.  
In a third experiment, we manipulated relevance by evoking different implicit 
contexts. In general, when a context is explicitly provided, participants may expect the 
premises of a problem to be relevant in this explicit context or, at least, in the wider 
context implicitly evoked by this explicit context. If the explicit and implicit contexts are 
related in content to the premises, this should strengthen the expectation of relevance 
and encourage participants to derive positive conclusions from the premises rather than 
answer that nothing follows. Inversely, if the explicit and implicit contexts are unrelated 
in content to the premises, this should lower participant’s expectations of relevance and 
encourage them to say that nothing follows. Here is how we tested this prediction. 
Consider Problems 7 and 8: 
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Problem 7: 
Context:  A, B, and C, who were measured during a medical examination, are not 
of the same height 
Premises:  A is taller than B 
A is taller than C 
Problem 8: 
Context:  A, B, and C did not win the same amount of money at the last lottery, 
Premises:  A is taller than B 
A is taller than C 
 
The explicit context of Problem 7, by mentioning measurements of height as part of a 
medical examination evokes an implicit context of common knowledge where 
differences in height may have implications for health, performance, accessibility to 
certain jobs, and so on. This should encourage participants to see the conclusion “A is 
taller than B and C” as potentially relevant in this implicit context. The explicit context 
of Problem 8, mentioning the winning of money in a lottery, evokes an implicit context 
of common knowledge where individual height plays no role at all. Hence, we should 
observe a much lower rate of determinate conclusions for Problem 8 than for Problem 7. 
Our results (see Table 3) confirmed that there were many more determinate conclusions 
for Problem 7 (76.5%) than for Problem 8 (42.9%, χ2 (1) = 38.8, p < .0001).  
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Table 3: Percentage of conclusion types for Problems 8 and 9 
 Problem 7 
N=162 
Problem 8 
N=168 
Determinate conclusions 76.5 42.9 
Nothing follows 19.8 50.6 
Errors and weird answers  3.7 6.5 
 
The experiments presented in this section give support to the cognitive principle 
of relevance, i.e. the claim that human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation 
of relevance, by corroborating some of its consequences in the area of psychology of 
reasoning. More specifically, the choice to draw or not to draw conclusions from a given 
set of premises, and the choice of which particular conclusion to draw, if any, are guided 
by considerations of relevance. People are inclined to draw a specific conclusion from a 
set of premises to the extent that this conclusion seems potentially relevant. This is a 
non-trivial consequence of the cognitive principle of relevance. It has in turn non-trivial 
consequences for the study of reasoning in general. In particular, people’s failure to 
derive some specific conclusion in a reasoning task may be due not to poor logical 
capacities or to pragmatic problems of comprehension of the task, but to the failure to 
see as relevant either the conclusion they were intended to draw, or, more subtly, the 
failure to see the relevance of some intermediary inferential step necessary for deriving 
the intended conclusion. In spontaneous inference, being guided by consideration of 
relevance should contribute to the overall efficiency of inferential processes, but it may 
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also, on occasion, prevent one from reaching some highly relevant conclusion because 
crucial intermediary steps didn’t seem relevant at all. 
  
4. Testing the Communicative Principle of Relevance with the Wason Selection 
Task 
Wason’s Selection Task (Wason, 1966) has been the most commonly used tool in 
the psychology of reasoning (see Manktelow, 1999). Genuine versions of Wason's 
selection task share the same basic four-component structure: 
 (i) An introduction (sometimes in a narrative form); 
(ii) A conditional statement known as the "rule", with the linguistic form "If P, then 
Q," and either a descriptive content stating how things are, or a deontic content 
stating how they should be; 
(iii) Four cards: one representing a case where P is satisfied, one where P is not 
satisfied, one where Q is satisfied, and one where Q is not satisfied (known 
respectively as the P, the not-P, the Q, and the not-Q cards). When the card 
displays information about P, information about Q is hidden, and conversely. 
(iv) The instruction to select all and only those cards where the hidden information 
must be made visible in order to judge whether the rule is true (in descriptive 
versions) or is being obeyed (in deontic versions). 
For example the text of an "abstract" descriptive selection task might be: "Here are four 
cards. Each has a number on one side and a letter on the other side. Two of these cards are 
here with the letter side up, and two with the number side up. Indicate which of these 
cards you need to turn over in order to judge whether or not the following rule is true: "If 
there is a 6 on one side, there is an E on the other side". 
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With such an abstract version of the task, typically only about 10% of participants make 
the correct selection of the 6 and G cards, that is, the cards that represent the P case and 
the not-Q case.  
In a typical example of a deontic version of the task (Griggs & Cox, 1982), 
participants are presented with a rule such as "If a person is drinking beer, then that 
person must be over 18 years of age", and with cards representing four individuals in a 
bar, with what they are drinking indicated on one side of the cards, and their age indicated 
on the other side. The four cards represent respectively a person drinking beer, a person 
drinking soda (with the age hidden for these first two persons), a person aged 29, and a 
person aged 16 (with the drink hidden for these two other persons). Participants are 
instructed to select the cards that must be turned over to see whether any of these four 
people is breaking the rule. Typically, the correct card combination (i.e., the P-card "This 
person is drinking beer" and the not-Q card "This person is 16 years old") is selected by 
well over 50% of the participants.  
Work on the selection task has been the basis of a variety of claims about human 
reasoning and rationality. In particular, it has been taken to show that most individuals 
do not, in general, reason in accordance with the rules of logic, not even the elementary 
rules of propositional calculus, as evidenced by their failure to select the P and the not-Q 
cards in descriptive versions of the task (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Griggs & Cox, 
1982). Does the selection task really provide a tool to test general claims about human 
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reasoning? Evans (1989) maintained that participants understand the task as one of 
identifying the relevant cards, and use, for this, heuristic cues of relevance rather than 
deductive reasoning. Extending this insight, Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) put 
forward a general explanation of the selection task based on relevance theory. They 
argued that participants’ performance on the selection task is best explained by 
considering that (1) the very process of linguistic comprehension provides participants 
with intuitions of relevance, (2) these intuitions, just as comprehension generally, are 
highly content and context dependent, and (3) participants trust their intuitions of 
relevance and select cards accordingly. In standard versions of the task, these intuitions 
are misleading. In other versions, many deontic versions in particular, people’s 
intuitions of relevance point towards the correct selection of cards. If, in the selection 
task, pragmatic comprehension mechanisms determine participants’ response and thus 
pre-empt the use of whatever domain-general or domain-specific reasoning mechanisms 
people are endowed with, the task cannot be a good tool for the study of these reasoning 
mechanisms. On the other hand, it may be of some use in studying people’s intuitions of 
relevance. 
Participants presented with a Wason selection task approach the text of the problem, 
and in particular the conditional rule, in the same way in which they approach all 
utterances in conversation or in reading. They make use of their standard comprehension 
abilities. The very fact that a text is presented to them raises expectations of relevance, 
and they search for an interpretation that satisfies these expectations (which, given the 
artificiality of the task, may be quite modest). In doing so, they follow the relevance-
guided comprehension procedure explained above in (8), that is, they follow a path of 
least effort in constructing interpretive hypotheses and stop when their expectations of 
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relevance are satisfied. This is, in particular, what participants do with the conditional rule 
of the selection task: guided by expectations of relevance, they derive from it 
consequences that might justify these expectations. 
The rule itself, being a conditional statement, is not directly testable. Merely by 
looking at the two sides of a card, you can check the truth or falsity of a plain atomic 
statement or of a conjunction of atomic statements such as “there is a 6 on one side of this 
card and an E on the other side.” It is true if it matches your observations, and false 
otherwise. You cannot however confirm a conditional statement such as “if there is 6 on 
one side, then there is an E on the other side” by matching it to your observations. The 
truth of a conditional statement is tested indirectly, by deriving from it consequences that 
are directly testable and testing these. Participants have therefore two reasons to derive 
consequences from the rule. The first reason is to interpret it in a way that satisfies their 
expectation of relevance. The second reason is to find directly testable consequences of 
the rule in order to give a sensible response to the experimenter. What they do in practice 
is give a response that is based on the consequences they spontaneously derived in 
interpreting the rule, without looking for other consequences that might provide a better 
test of the rule. What they should do, in principle, is make sure that not only the 
consequences they derive are entailed by the rule but also that, conversely, the rule is 
entailed by these consequences. Otherwise, the consequences might be true and the rule 
false. This would involve more than just reasoning in accordance with the rules of 
propositional calculus. It would require also higher-order reasoning about the structure of 
the problem. People’s failure to do so shows not that, presented with such a problem, they 
are illogical, but that they are unreflective or, at least, insufficiently reflective, and 
overconfident in their intuitions of relevance. 
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In the case of the abstract task described above, participants may infer from the rule 
“If there is a 6 on one side, there is an E on the other side” that the card with 6 must have 
an E on the other side. They may also infer from the rule the consequence that there are 
cards with a 6 and an E (otherwise the rule would be irrelevant). Making either or both of 
these consequences part of the interpretation of the rule contributes to its relevance by 
indicating what one might expect to see when turning over the cards. If participants use 
the first of these two consequences to decide which cards must be turned over in order to 
see whether the rule is true or false, they will select just the card with a 6 (the P card). If 
they use just the second consequence, or if they use both, they will turn over the card with 
a 6 and that with an E (the P card and the Q card). These are indeed the most frequent 
selections with standard selection tasks. In a deontic case such as that of the drinking-age 
problem, participants might, in order to satisfy their expectations of relevance, derive 
from the rule ("If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 18 years of 
age") the consequence that there should be no beer drinker under 18. They would then 
select the card representing a beer drinker (the P card) and that representing a person 
under 18 (the not-Q card), thus, as it happens, providing the correct selection. 
Why should the consequences derived in the two problems be different? Because 
they are derived in their order of accessibility until expectations of relevance are reached, 
and both order of accessibility and expected level of relevance are context-dependent. In 
both problems—and in general with conditional statements—, the most accessible 
consequence is the modus ponens one: in the abstract problem, it is that the card with a 6 
should have an E on the other side, and in the drinking age problem, it is that the beer 
drinker should be 18 or above. In both cases, this implication determines the selection of 
the P card, which is indeed selected by most participants in both experiments. Why, then, 
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do many participants select also the Q card in the abstract version, and the majority of 
participants select the not-Q card in the drinking age problem (as in most deontic versions 
of the task)? In the abstract problem above, the implication “there are cards with a vowel 
and an even number” is much more easily accessed than the implication “there are no 
cards with a vowel and without an even number,” and satisfies the low expectations of 
relevance raised by this artificial problem. In the drinking age problem, on the other hand, 
the implication that there should not be underage beer drinkers is the most accessible and 
the only one that satisfies expectation of relevance: commonsensically, the point of a 
normative rule such as “If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 18” is 
not to make adult beer drinkers more common, but to make underage beer drinker less 
common. 
By devising appropriate rule-context pairs, the order of accessibility of consequences 
and expectations of relevance can be manipulated and it should be possible to elicit 
different pattern of selection, including logically correct selections. Sperber et al. (1995) 
produced several descriptive versions of the task that elicited a higher percentage of 
correct responses than had ever been found before with such versions. They showed that – 
contrary to what was generally believed at the time – good performance is not restricted 
to deontic versions.6 Girotto, Kemmelmeir, Sperber & Van der Henst (2001) provided 
further evidence for the relevance approach by demonstrating how it can be used to 
manipulate deontic versions of the task and obtain at will either the common correct P and 
not-Q selections or incorrect P and Q selections (more commonly found in descriptive 
versions). Further experiments and comparisons with the approach of Leda Cosmides and 
                                                 
6 Other studies have confirmed this: e.g., Green & Larking, 1995; Hardman, 1998; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1995; Liberman & Klar, 1996; Love & Kessler, 1995. 
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her collaborators (Cosmides, 1989; Fiddick, Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) can be found in 
Sperber & Girotto (2002, in press). Here, by way of illustration, we give just two 
examples of these experiments, one succinctly, the other in greater detail. 
Girotto, et al (2001) used the following problem (adapted a problem from Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985): “Imagine that you work in a travel agency and that the boss asks you to 
check that the clients of the agency had obeyed the rule ‘If a person travels to any East 
African country, then that person must be immunized against cholera,’ by examining 
cards representing these clients, their destinations and their immunizations.” The four 
cards indicated “Mr. Neri. Destination: Ethiopia”, “Mr. Verdi. Destination: Canada”, 
“Immunizations done: Cholera” and “Immunizations done: None”, respectively, and as 
usual, participants were asked which card had to be examined in order to find out whether 
the rule had been obeyed by the clients of the agency. In this context, the relevance of the 
rule is to prevent people without cholera immunization from travelling to East African 
countries. We predicted therefore that participants would choose the P card (a traveller to 
an East African country) and the not-Q card (a person without cholera immunization). 
Such a prediction is not specific to relevance theory. It would be shared by all researchers 
in the area, whatever their theoretical viewpoint. It reiterates, after all, common findings, 
that have been explained, for instance, by proposing that people have pragmatic reasoning 
schemas for reasoning about obligations and permission (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), or 
that they have an evolved “Darwinian algorithm” for reasoning about social contracts 
(Cosmides, 1989). 
According to the relevance-theoretic approach, what causes the selection of the P and 
not-Q cards in this deontic scenario is that the presence of individuals violating the 
cholera rule among the people represented by the cards would be more relevant than the 
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presence of individuals obeying the rule. Could this relative relevance of cases of 
violation vs. cases of conformity be reversed by altering the context, which, if the 
relevance approach is correct, should cause participants to chose the P and the Q card? To 
do this, we used the same scenario, with a twist. The narrative stated that contrary to what 
the boss of the agency had thought, cholera immunization is not required anymore when 
travelling to East Africa. The boss is now worried that she may have misinformed clients 
and caused them to follow a rule that is no longer in force. She then asks the employee to 
see whether or not clients have obeyed the rule “If a person travels to any East African 
country, then that person must be immunized against cholera” by looking at cards similar 
to those used in the previous condition. In this context, what is relevant is that some 
clients may have followed the false rule and that they may have been immunized 
unnecessarily (and might, for instance, sue the agency). On the other hand, the case of 
clients who have ignored the rule is no longer relevant. We predicted therefore that 
participants would select the P card (a traveller to an East African country) and the Q card 
(a person with cholera immunization). Note that this prediction is non-standard but 
follows from the relevance-based explanation of the selection task. This prediction was 
confirmed. Table 4 shows the results we obtained in a within participants design. (We 
also obtained practically the same results with a between-subject design.) 
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Table 4: Percentage of the main selection patterns in the true and false cholera rule 
selection task. 
Pattern True rule False rule 
P and not-Q 62 15 
P and Q 26 71 
Other 12 14 
 
This cholera-rule experiment gives, we hope, an intuitively clear illustration of the 
role of relevance in participants’ response to selection task problems. However, it 
remains too intuitive to give a truly specific confirmation to the communicative principle 
of relevance. In particular, it throws no light on the respective role of effect and effort in 
guiding participants’ intuitions of relevance and selection of cards. 
In their Experiment 4, Sperber et al. (1995) aimed at taking apart the two factors of 
relevance, effect and effort, testing their respective roles, and ascertaining whether 
relevance, which combines the effort and the effect factors in a principled manner, is 
more explanatory than effort or effect taken alone. For this, they created four scenarios, 
varying the effect and the effort factors separately in four conditions names effect-
/effort+, effect-/effort-, effect+/effort+, and effect+/effort- (see Figure 1). All four 
scenarios involved a machine that manufactures cards with a number on one side and a 
letter on the other side. A character, Mr. Bianchi, asserts: “If a card has a 6 on the front, 
it has an E on the back.” In all conditions, the four cards had respectively a 6, a 4, an E 
and an A on the visible side, and participants were asked which card or cards had to be 
turned over to check whether what Mr. Bianchi says is true.  
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Figure 1: The four conditions of the machine experiment (Sperber et al. 1995). 
Effect-/Effort + Effect-/Effort- Effect+/Effort+ Effect+/Effort - 
A machine manufactures cards. 
It is programmed to print at random, on the front of each card, 
A number 
 
On the back of each 
card, it prints a letter: 
- When there is a 6, it 
prints an E. 
- When there is not a 6, 
it prints a letter at 
random. 
A 4 or a 6 
 
On the back of each 
card, it prints a letter:
- When there is a 6, it 
prints an E. 
- When there is a 4, it 
prints an E or an A at 
random. 
A number 
 
On the back of 
each card, it 
prints a letter 
at random. 
 
a 4 or a 6 
 
On the back of 
each card, it 
prints either an 
E or an A at 
random. 
 
One day, Mr Bianchi, the person in charge, realises 
that the machine has produced some cards it should 
not have printed. On the back of the cards with a 6, 
the machine has not always printed an E: 
 sometimes it has 
printed any letter at 
random. 
sometimes it has 
printed an A 
instead of an E. 
The person in charge, Mr Bianchi, 
examines the cards and has the 
strong impression that the machine 
does not really print letters and 
numbers at random. I think, he 
says, that  
Mr Bianchi fixes the machine, examines the newly 
printed cards and says: don't worry, the machine 
works fine,  
 
 
if a card has a 6 on the front, it has an E on the back 
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From the conditional “If a card has a 6 on the front, it has an E on the back” 
participants are sure to derive consequence (12). They may also derive either or both of 
(13) and (14): 
 
(12) The card with a 6 has an E on the other side 
(13) There are cards with a 6 and an E 
(14) There are no cards with a 6 and without an E 
 
In the two effort+ conditions, (13) is easier to derive than (14), which involves two 
negations. Moreover (14) does not carry any obvious effect worth the extra effort. So we 
should expect participants to base their selections either on (12) and to select just the E, 
or on (12) and (13), and to select both the E and the 6. 
To increase the probability that participants would derive consequence (14) 
before (13), we could act on the effort side or on the effect side. To act on the effort side, 
we had, in the two effort- conditions, the machine print only 6s and 4s on one side and 
Es and As on the other side. Instead of an indefinite number of possible number-letters 
combinations (e.g. 9X26=234 if only numbers from 1 to 9 are used), we have now four 
possible combinations; 6 and E, 6 and A, 4 and E, and 4 and A, which are all equally 
easy to represent. This makes it possible to simplify (14) and replace it with (14’) 
 
(14’) There are no cards with a 6 and an A 
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We predicted that (14’) being easier to represent than (14), more participants 
would derive it and would, accordingly, select the card with an A rather than the card 
with an E in the effort- conditions than in the effort+ conditions. 
To increase the probability that participants’ expectations of effect would be 
satisfied with an interpretation of the rule as implying (14) rather than (13), we 
developed the scenario, in the two effect+ conditions, as follows: the machine was 
supposed to print an E on the back of cards with a 6; however the machine ceased to 
function properly and printed cards with a 6 and a letter other than an E; after having 
repaired it, Mr. Bianchi, asserted: “If a card has a 6 on the front, it has an E on the back.” 
In such a context, the relevance of Mr. Bianchi’s assertion went through the implication 
that there were no cards with a 6 and a letter other than an E (in other terms, 
consequence (14)). On the other hand, in such a context, consequence (13) does not 
contribute to the relevance of the conditional. We predicted therefore that in the two 
effect+ conditions, participants would more often infer (14) and select the 6 and the A 
card than in the effect- conditions. 
The two effect+ conditions on the one hand, and the two effect- conditions on the 
other hand, differ from one another only on the effort side, while the two effort+ and the 
two effort- conditions differ from one another only on the effect side. Given this, the 
predictions that follow from the relevance-theoretic account of the task are self-evident: 
the best performance should be with the effect+/effort- condition, and the worse one 
with the effect-/effort+ condition. The performance on the effect+/effort+ and on the 
effect-/effort- condition should be at an intermediary level between the two other 
conditions. Moreover, the two factors, effect and effort, should, each on its own, 
contribute to good performance. 
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The results are summarised in figure 2:  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of 6 and E (incorrect) and 6 and A (correct) responses in the 
four versions of the Machine problem. 
5%
38% 38%
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Effect-/effort+ Effect-/effort- Effect+/effort+ Effect+/effort-
6 and E
6 and A
 
These results confirm our prediction. Both factors of relevance, effect and effort, were 
shown to play a role in performance. These results show how effort and effect factors 
can be manipulated independently or jointly so as to favour one interpretation of a 
conditional statement over another. The advantage of the selection task paradigm in this 
context is that participants’ interpretations of the rule are rendered manifest by their 
selection of cards. 
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5. Testing the Communicative Principle of Relevance with a speech production task  
According to the communicative principle of relevance, utterances convey a 
presumption of their own optimal relevance, and do so whether or not they actually are 
optimally relevant. Speakers may fail to achieve relevance, or they may not even try, 
and, in such cases, the presumption of optimal relevance is unjustified. Justified or not, it 
is automatically conveyed by every utterance used in communication, and it guides the 
process of comprehension. Most research exploring the consequences of the 
communicative principle of relevance have, accordingly, focused on the comprehension 
process. Still, the communicative principle could not be right—and relevance could not 
guide comprehension—if speakers were not, often enough, trying to be optimally 
relevant, and successful at it. In the study that we report in this section, we investigate 
the degree to which speakers actually aim at being relevant, even when talking to perfect 
strangers from whom they have little to expect in return. 
Imagine the following exchange between two strangers in the street: 
 
(15)     Mr X: Hello, do you have the time, please? 
Mrs Y: Oh yes, it is 4:30 
 
In fact, Mrs Y’s watch does not indicate 4:30 but 4:28. She has chosen to round her 
answer even though she could have been more accurate. Rounding numbers is quite 
common. People round when talking about money, distance, time, weight, and so on. 
What explains this behaviour? We recently proposed that rounding is in part explained 
by considerations of relevance (Van der Henst, Carles & Sperber, 2002). A rounded 
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answer is generally more relevant than an accurate one, and speakers round in order to 
be relevant to their hearer. 
In a few situations, when taking a train for instance, a person asking for the time is 
better off with an answer precise to the minute. If your train leaves at 4:29, and you are 
told that it is 4:30 while it is in fact 4:28, you may believe that you’ve missed it when in 
fact you could still catch it. On the other hand, if you were told that it is 4:25, you might 
end up missing your train by considering that you still had four minutes to board it. In 
most situations, however, the consequences you would draw from a time rounded to the 
nearest multiple of five minutes are the same as those you would draw from a time 
accurate to the minute. So, in general, rounding does no harm. Does it do any good? 
Rounded number requires less processing effort. 4:30 is easier to manipulate than 4:28. 
Communicating rounded numbers may thus be a way to provide an optimally relevant 
answer to addressees by reducing their processing effort without compromising any 
cognitive effect likely to be derived.  
In most situations then, a speaker who is asked for the time and wishing to be as 
relevant as possible would round her answer. She might however be rounding for other 
reasons. In particular, if she wears an analogue watch indicating only numbers that are 
multiple of five, it may be easier for her to round than not to round. She might then 
round to minimise, not her audience’s effort, but her own. In fact, a sceptic might argue, 
the goal of minimising one’s audience’s effort might not play any role in the tendency of 
people asked for the time to give a rounder answer. 
In order to find out whether a tendency to optimize relevance was a factor in 
rounding the time, we approached people on the campus of the Paris University of Paris 
VII and just asked them: “Hello, Do you have the time please?” (Van der Henst, Carles 
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& Sperber, 2002). We took note of their response and of the type of watch they were 
wearing: analogue or digital, and distinguished two groups, the “analogue” and the 
“digital” group. For people with a digital watch, it requires less effort to just read aloud 
the exact time indicated by their watch than to round it to the closest to multiple of five. 
If people asked for the time were just trying to minimize their own effort, then they 
should always round when their watch is analogue, and never do so when it is digital. 
On the other hand, if people are also motivated by the goal of reducing their audience’s 
effort, then, not only people with analogue watches, but also a significant percentage of 
people with digital watch should round. 
What we found is that people rounded in both conditions. The percentage of 
rounders is calculated on the basis of the percentages of responses which indicate the 
time in a multiple of five minutes. If people never rounded there should be 20% of such 
responses (this is the theoretical distribution of numbers which are multiples of 5). 
However, the percentages we observed in the two conditions were much higher: 98% of 
answers were multiple of 5 in the analogue group, and 65.8% in the digital group. This 
means that 97% of people rounded in the analogue condition and 57% in the digital one7 
(see Figure 3). Hence, even though participants of the digital group rounded less than 
participants of the analogue group, a majority of them did, remarkably, made an extra 
effort in order to diminish the effort of their audience.  
 
                                                 
7 To calculate the percentage of rounders we used the following formula: Percentage of 
rounders = (M – 20)/80, where M is equal to the percentage of answers given in a 
multiple of five. When M is equal to 20, the percentage of rounders is equal to 0, when it 
is equal to 100, so is the percentage of rounders.  
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Figure 3: Percentages of rounders in the three experiments: In Experiment 1, participants 
wore analogue watches in the “analogue” group, and digital watches in the “digital” 
group; in Experiment 2, participants were just asked for the time in the “control” group, 
and were asked for the time by an experimenter setting his watch in the “experimental” 
group; in Experiment 3, participants were asked for the time more than 15 minutes 
before the time at which the experimenter said he or she had an appointement in the 
“earlier” group, and less than 15 minutes before the appointment in the “later” group. 
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Some people with analogue watches may round just in order to save their own 
effort, but the case of people with digital watch shows that a majority of people are 
disposed to round, even when this means making an extra effort. We attributed this 
disposition to a more general disposition, that of trying to produce optimally relevant 
utterances. Still, an alternative explanation could be that people round in order to 
minimize their commitment: they may not be sure that their watch is precise to the 
minute, and be more confident that it is accurate within a five-minute interval. Indeed, 
this desire to minimize commitment may account for some of the rounding we observed, 
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but could it be enough to make the relevance-based explanation superfluous? To 
investigate this possibility, we created a situation where accuracy manifestly contributed 
to relevance. 
Although rounded answers are easier to process than non-rounded ones, there are 
some situations, such as that of the train evoked above, where optimal relevance depends 
upon cognitive effects that are carried only by a more accurate answer. Speakers guided 
by the goal of producing an optimally relevant answer should, in this condition, provide, 
if they can, a more precise answer than in the ordinary kind of situation in which our 
first experiment took place.  
We tested this prediction in Experiment 2 with two groups of people. In the control 
group, participants were approached in the same way as in the previous experiment and 
were just asked for the time. In the experimental group, the request for the time was 
framed in a context in which an accurate answer was obviously more relevant. The 
experimenter approached the participant with a watch held in his hand and said: «Hello! 
My watch isn’t working properly. Do you have the time please?” In this context, it was 
clear that the experimenter was asking for the time in order to set his own watch and 
that, for this purpose, an answer precise to the minute would be more relevant. Only the 
answers of participants with an analogue watch were recorded. Participants had 
therefore to make an extra effort in order to provide an accurate answer. We found that 
participants were much more accurate in the experimental than in the control condition: 
there were 94% of rounders in the control condition and only 49% in the experimental 
one (see Figure 3, Experiment 2). This means that 51% of participants of the 
experimental group gave the requester a time accurate to the minute. Note that rounded 
answers may nevertheless have been in conformity with the presumption of optimal 
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relevance: even if approximate, they were relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s 
attention, as required by the first clause of the presumption, and, as required by second 
clause, they may have been the most relevant ones compatible with the speakers’ 
abilities (if they had doubts about the accuracy of their watch), or preferences (if they 
were reluctant to work out a more precise answer). Our results show anyhow that a 
majority of the people not only understood that accuracy was more relevant in this 
condition but also were able and willing to make the effort of giving an accurate answer. 
That accuracy to the minute is relevant to someone setting his watch is easy enough 
to understand. It need not involve the kind of refined concern for relevance that 
relevance theory presupposes. In a third experiment, we manipulated the relationship 
between relevance and accuracy a much subtler way.  
Suppose you want to know how much time you have left before an appointment at 
4:00pm. The more you will approach the time of the appointment the more accuracy is 
likely to be relevant. At 3:32, being told that it is 3:30 is likely to have practically the 
same effect as being told, more accurately, that it is 3:32. On the other hand being told at 
3:58 that it is 4:00, is likely to be misleading. Two minutes may, for instance, be the 
time you need to reach the place of your appointment. In other words, the closer you are 
to the time of the appointment, the more accuracy becomes relevant. 
In the third experiment, all participants were approached in the same way and told 
“Hello Do you have the time please? I have an appointment at T” We then divided 
participants into two groups: the “earlier” group of those who gave a time between 30 to 
16 minutes before the time of the appointment and a “later” group of those who 
answered with a time between 14 minutes before the time of the appointment to the time 
of the appointment itself. As we had predicted, the results show that participants rounded 
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less in the “later” group (75% of participants) than in the “earlier” group (97%). 22% 
difference may not seem so impressive until you realize that those people in the later 
group who did give an accurate answer, not only were willing to make the effort of 
reading more carefully their analogue watch and had enough confidence in its accuracy, 
but also made the extra effort of taking the perspective of the stranger who was 
addressing them and of inferring that accuracy, at this point in time, would contribute to 
the relevance of their utterance. 
The experiments described in this section show how subtle aspects of people’s 
spontaneous speech behaviour can be predicted on the basis of the communicative 
principle of relevance: speakers tend to produce utterances that justify the presumption 
of optimal relevance these utterances automatically convey. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The studies reported in this chapter tested and confirmed predictions directly 
inspired by central tenets of relevance theory and, in particular, by the cognitive and the 
communicative principles of relevance. Of course, it would take many more successful 
experiments involving a variety of aspects of cognition and communication to come 
anywhere near a compelling experimental corroboration of relevance theory itself. Still, 
from a pragmatic point of view, the few experiments we have presented here, together 
with others we have mentioned, show, we hope, how imagining, designing and carrying 
out experiments helps expand and sharpen pragmatic theory. From an experimental 
psychology point of view, these experiments illustrate how a pragmatic theory that is 
precise enough to have testable consequences can put previous experimental research in 
a novel perspective and can suggest new experimental paradigms.  
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